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Crises can be moments of opportunity—but for
whom? As I write, the stock market flourishes
and the Federal Reserve takes unprecedented
action to protect corporate America from the
fiscal meltdown caused by Covid-19.1 Yet a
social-economic disaster has engulfed the
American working class: lost jobs and health
insurance, and “essential workers” callously
exposed to the pandemic. Next in line are state
and local public sector workers. Absent substantial relief from Washington, government
employers will cry poverty, try to rip up union
contracts, and cut the provision of services.2
Will government workers, their unions, and the
affected public find ways to push back? Is there
the political will to tap heretofore untaxed
sources of revenue? Will public employee
unions focus only on defending their piece of
reduced budgets or attempt to flex atrophied
muscles, fighting alongside the communities
they serve to chart a more expansive and progressive vision of America?

Absent substantial relief from
Washington, government employers
will cry poverty, try to rip up union
contracts, and cut the provision of
services. Will government workers,
their unions, and the affected
public find ways to push back?
Scholars are naturally drawing parallels
between our current crisis and the Great
Depression.3 In the early 1930s, the AFL was
hesitant to seize the main chance, but despite the

perils of organizing at a time of mass unemployment, working-class struggles ultimately
emerged, sparking decades of protest and mass
movements that brought a liberatory rise in living standards, the Great Compression, and the
end of Jim Crow. Often, labor mobilized whole
working-class communities to help them organize and raise wages.4 And more often than they
are given credit for, unions led fights against
racial segregation and economic injustice in the
working-class neighborhoods where their members lived. It was not just in historian Herbert
Gutman’s studies of the nineteenth century that
labor and communities worked together.5 Thus
was built an imperfect yet, by subsequent standards, golden age of increasing equality.

The Harbinger of Neoliberal
Austerity
But another crisis, starting with budget shortfalls and imminent default in New York City
(NYC) (1974-1975), would usher in almost half
a century of neoliberal austerity and growing
inequality. As David Harvey, professor of
anthropology and geography, notes, “the management of the NYC fiscal crisis pioneered the
way for neoliberal practices both domestically
under Reagan and internationally through the
IMF [International Monetary Fund] in the
1980s.”6 Recently, historian Kim Phillips-Fein
has convincingly argued for the central role of
1
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Washington in imposing austerity as its price
for federal assistance. Treasury Secretary
William Simon and Council of Economic
Advisors Chair Alan Greenspan saw their
opportunity to dismantle NYC’s flawed but
vibrant form of social democracy as the opening salvo in an effort to unwind the New Deal/
Great Society state. New York’s symbolic significance as a town where the working class
and unions still wielded some power was icing
on the cake. Mainstream Democrats, led by
Senator William Proxmire, required stiffer concessions from New York’s municipal unions
before even the limited aid of bond guarantees
was proffered. Prodded by Washington, the
New York State government established an
“Emergency Financial Control Board” (EFCB),
headed by financiers and corporate executives,
to ride herd on the city budget and union contracts. By mid-1976, significant structural,
political, and cultural elements of workingclass austerity had been established.7

. . . responses of New York’s
seemingly powerful municipal trade
unions foreshadowed and perhaps
even set in motion the subsequent
fall of the house of labor nationally.
The halting, indecisive, and ultimately concessionary responses of New York’s seemingly
powerful municipal trade unions foreshadowed
and perhaps even set in motion the subsequent
fall of the house of labor nationally. They
accepted economic austerity and the ideological
premise that the working class should pay for
the crisis in exchange for a sort of junior-partner
corporatism or tripartitism. Successfully implemented in one labor stronghold, it spread in
almost exact form to another—the auto sector—
in 1979 via the wage concessions demanded by
President Carter as the price for Chrysler loan
guarantees. There, the private sector equivalent
of NYC’s wages tied to productivity and juniorpartner tripartitism were “profit sharing, instead
of indexed wages, and board representation.”8
Then came steel—wage cuts for tariff protections. A pattern was set: alongside abrupt bloodletting spurred by industries only too eager to
smash unions and cut wages were decades of
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managed decline in the wages and working conditions of the American working class. We hear
the same mantra today from the head of the
Service Employees International Union, who
argues that Republican anti-labor recalcitrance
can be overcome, “when we get employers,
workers and government coming together to
solve problems.”9
But was—and is—a different path possible?
In the proving ground of NYC, the municipal
labor unions and close observers first thought
their wage concessions and the paring of government-provisioned services were a painful
but only temporary setback.10 Later analyses
saw the long-term effects more clearly, even
mourned them, but largely accept contemporaneous assessments that these were the least bad
alternatives.11 Sometimes, solutions were
framed on a national scale—not wholly wrong,
but relieving local actors from agency and
responsibility.12 I argue, instead, that the present Covid-19-induced economic crisis allows
us to see those times more clearly. Although the
causes of the two crises were different, the
demand of capital and the state requiring the
working class to tighten their belts is strikingly
similar. Alternatives to austerity existed then, as
they do today; some of those alternatives were
and are local.13 Looking at what labor did
wrong then, might help it and working-class
movements now, as we hope for better outcomes than deepened austerity.

The Onset of the Crisis
Unlike our pre-Covid neoliberal social welfare
parsimony, during the decade prior to the fiscal
crisis of the 1970s, government expenditures
had risen due to higher wages and better benefits for public workers and increased services
and payments to the poor; this was the apogee of
the welfare state. Union gains began to slow in
the early 1970s, due to federal wage and price
guidelines and state legislation which rolled
back pension improvements. At the same time,
deindustrialization and white flight to the suburbs shrank NYC’s tax base, and federal disbursements to cities were slashed by the Nixon
administration. Then the 1969-1970 and 1973
recessions increased welfare costs and further
reduced tax revenues. For ten years, NYC
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addressed budget imbalances with healthy doses
of wishful thinking and, encouraged by its banking bond underwriters, increasing amounts of
short-term debt.14 In 1974, banks began to sell
their city bonds, bloating an already shrinking
market, causing rates for new debt to rise, and
further exacerbating financial pressures. In early
1975, banks refused to underwrite new NYC
debt. This created a cash flow crisis: bills had to
be paid, payroll met—and, of course, bonds
were supposed to be redeemed when due.15
This raised the possibility of default, where
the city government and various creditor groups
would spar in the courts on which disbursements to prioritize. Here was an unknown, then
and now: Would a court give most favorable
treatment to bondholders, or would it fear the
political dangers of imposing austerity in the
nation’s largest city? In a January 1975 memo to
his boss, the head of the municipal bond department at Chemical Bank raised the possibility
that banks would receive funds only after the
city payroll had been met. In August, the city’s
Corporation Counsel declared that “city services would certainly take precedence over
noteholders’ demands.” In September, the First
Deputy Mayor listed priorities in case of default:
“payroll, welfare, Medicaid, the Health and
Hospitals Corporation, day care, and transit.
Notably,” remarked Phillips-Fein, “the payment
of interest on the city’s debts was absent from
the list.”16 On October 17, 1975, when default
seemed imminent, the City Controller stopped
distribution of paychecks to sanitation workers,
yet simultaneously a State Supreme Court justice “signed a writ at the request of the city to
ratify priorities—with vital services heading the
list, and meeting city payrolls taking precedence
over payment to holders of city debts.”17 So, the
banks had plenty to be nervous about.

. . . Albert Shanker, head of the
United Federation of Teachers,
blinked first: he anteed up $150
million of pension fund money to
pay off bonds due that day, and
default was averted.
But so did union leaders. A court might conceivably undo labor contracts, order layoffs, or
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reduce retiree pensions. Later that day, Albert
Shanker, head of the United Federation of
Teachers (UFT), blinked first: he anteed up
$150 million of pension fund money to pay off
bonds due that day, and default was averted.18
Shanker’s decision marked the final chapter in
a year-long turn of the municipal unions from
bravado to concessions. In this high-stakes
game of “chicken,” the Simon-Greenspan strategy had worked.

Labor, With and Without
the Community
Are unions inevitably defensive organizations
rather than weapons of the working class, as
economist and labor historian Selig Perlman
argued almost a century ago?19 Must they lose
vigor and become institutionalized? That was
the intent of NYC Mayor Robert Wagner (19541965), who had spent years offering union recognition and bargaining rights in return for
pliability and deference. The city’s Office of
Collective Bargaining (1965) and the state’s
Taylor Law (1967) were meant to regularize
employer–union relationships, mediate disputes, prevent strikes, and limit the scope of
bargaining to the “terms and conditions of
employment.”20 Yet Perlman’s argument would
have seemed dubious (and government’s efforts
fruitless) in 1967 New York. The city was in the
midst of years of “can you top this?” efforts by
its municipal unions, resulting in a spate of
strikes despite the legal prohibitions. Lacking
union- or agency-shop provisions, unions had
to be aggressive enough to convince workers to
sign up and become members. Moreover, some
strikes had what we now call “bargaining for
the common good” goals—demands benefiting
the public the union served. Against fierce city
resistance, a two-month strike of social workers
in 1965 pushed to expand scope of bargaining,
to a limited extent winning better treatment of
their welfare clients and smaller caseloads.
Teachers did the same when they fought for
smaller class sizes and increased funding for
schools in poverty-stricken neighborhoods.21
Some contractual demands can be simultaneously self-interested and altruistic.
But alliances with the public around a common social-democratic vision could also be
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ruptured by conflicting agendas, electoral
needs, or simply union leadership disinclination toward consultation and deference. The
UFT, which had fought so hard to expand
teacher autonomy, resisted ceding some of it
back to communities and parents who sought
more control over curriculum, hiring, and even
discipline of students.22 Its infamous twomonth Ocean Hill-Brownsville strike in the fall
of 1968 pitted the union’s line-in-the-sand
defense of job security and its seniority system
against the neighborhood school board’s desire
to implement a more Afro-centric curriculum
and rid itself of a handful of teachers seen as
openly defying that effort.23 In 1971, municipal
workers, upset that negotiated pension improvements were stalled in the state legislature,
locked drawbridges in the open position and
released untreated sewage into surrounding
waterways.24 Here were cases where the “special interests” of public workers and city residents seemed directly counter-posed. In 1975,
when it seemed inevitable that the expenditure
pie would shrink, squabbling over the crumbs
intensified. While municipal workers, small
businesses, the poor, and the working class
fought “defensive battle[s],” economist William
Tabb observed, “banks, developers, and corporations expect incentives. . . . these ‘bribes’ by
the state . . . force a reduction in public sector
services.” It was not inevitable that in 1980, 20
percent of revenue went to debt service, while
only 13 percent was allocated for all human
resources and social service expenditures.25
Rather, it reflected which class was unafraid to
grasp for and seize power.

From Resistance to
Concessions
In the first months of the fiscal crisis, prodded
by angry and fearful members, and with even
some Local presidents calling for a general
strike against layoffs, city unions rejected the
narrative that there was no money and workers
must sacrifice.26 The public apex of union
efforts came during the summer of 1975. A June
demonstration outside the corporate headquarters of David Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan
Bank, meant “to dramatize their assertion that
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the banks are bleeding the city by imposing high
interest rates on city borrowing,” was called “a
very, very scary kind of experience” by financier Felix Rohatyn. Thirty thousand rallied
against budget cuts at a protest jointly called by
the UFT and a Board of Education not under
mayoral control. Laid-off police closed down
the Brooklyn Bridge. After a two-day sanitation
worker wildcat strike, the city rescinded the layoffs of a quarter of that workforce. Mayor Abe
Beame, caught between insistent banks and
union mobilizations, waffled, announcing layoffs and then postponing them.27

In 1975, when it seemed inevitable
that the expenditure pie would
shrink, squabbling over the crumbs
intensified.
On the first day of school, UFT leftists led
angry teachers facing ten thousand layoffs,
mass reassignments, and class sizes of forty and
even fifty in an overwhelming rejection of a
tentative contract that sanctioned these horrific
learning conditions and added a wage freeze.28
“The mood,” the New York Times reported,
“was that of enthusiasm for a fight that, the
teachers said, was not for their benefit alone,
but for the benefit of their pupils. Their rallying
cry was lower class sizes.”29 Voting to strike the
next day, at least the glimmer of a renewed alliance with parents and communities beckoned.
Meanwhile, though, the unions laid the
groundwork for concessions. According to historian Joshua Freeman, the Chase Manhattan demonstration “seemed to frighten [Victor]
Gotbaum,” the head of AFSCME DC37, New
York’s largest union.30 Behind closed doors,
Gotbaum, Teamsters Local 237 President Barry
Feinstein, and trusted consultant Jack Bigel negotiated the so-called Americana agreement (named
for the hotel where the deal was struck); meekly,
most other unions signed on. The agreement
rolled back an earlier wage hike and pledged
work rule concessions to fund health benefits.31 A
handful of labor autocrats decided on austerity:
there were no membership votes on these contractual changes, and even discussion in the officer and delegate bodies was squelched.32 Yet the
unions received no guarantees against further
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service cuts or layoffs, which reached 20 percent
of the workforce within a year.33

apparently been projected on taxpayers, municipal workers, and service recipients.”37

A handful of labor autocrats
decided on austerity: there were
no membership votes on these
contractual changes, and even
discussion in the officer and
delegate bodies was squelched.

Shanker chastised his members: “A
strike is a weapon you use against
a boss that has money.This boss has
no money.” In fact, the city did have
money . . .

Now, the unions’ problem became one of
managing their members’ dashed expectations.
The police and firefighters’ unions—which had
rejected the Americana agreement but found
themselves effectively bound by its terms—were
the least successful, and for a period of time,
their leaders were ousted at each election. Just
three weeks after their successful wildcat strike,
the city renewed layoffs of sanitation workers,
and despite sporadic picketing of garages, the
union convinced its members to challenge that
action (ultimately, unsuccessfully) in the courts
rather than the streets.34 After a week on strike,
demoralized teachers narrowly accepted the
same pact they had rejected and returned to
work. Their lost pay and the fines levied for
striking under the Taylor Law subsidized the
return of a quarter of the laid-off staff—“the
strike has been a tax on teachers,” the Board of
Education gloated—while additional cuts in
payroll costs were effectively achieved by eliminating ninety minutes of schooling a week. Here
was an agreement crafted to save the city money
at the expense of students.35
Shanker chastised his members: “A strike is a
weapon you use against a boss that has money.
This boss has no money.”36 In fact, the city did
have money, but it was seemingly committed to
using it to prevent default. A month later, when
Shanker (following his peers) agreed to load up
his pension fund with city bonds, the circle was
closed. Heretofore, the unions had worried that
payments to creditors would supersede those to
workers and retirees; now, their retirees were the
creditors, seemingly bound by self-interest to
support austerity politics. In just a few months,
“a fatalism toward the inevitability of cuts had

Once unions accepted the premise of steep
service reductions, imposition of tuition at the
City University, and transit fare hikes, they forfeited their ability to rally the people of New
York against austerity. Recounting two
instances where cuts were partially averted,
Phillips-Fein finds no magic bullet.38 In the
context of a fragmented opposition, Darwinian
competition prevailed. A handful of the best
organized staved off the worst consequences of
a larger, grimmer story.

Political Insiders, but at What
Cost?
What of the unions themselves? Concessions
and pension fund money allowed them to maintain their institutional presence, if not substantial influence—a slim silver lining to the cloud
of austerity and forty years of increasing
inequality. Priding themselves as “political
insiders,” scholars Marco Hauptmeier and
Lowell Turner observe, New York’s unions
made little attempt to build the social agenda
coalitions that might have brought them real
power.39 Collective bargaining was “saved”—if
it was ever really at risk—but the decades since
have exchanged calamitous decline for the slow
drip of defeat. Labor scholar Ian MacDonald
asks how it can be that New York is both the
center of neoliberalism and a “union town,” and
answers that the victors of the fiscal crisis
worked through existing institutions of class
relations rather than destroy them.40
Three 1977 events show this institutionalization of collaboration, and the rejection of a class
perspective, more explicitly. Beginning that
January, union leaders and bankers met monthly
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over “coffee, doughnuts [for] some very private
discussion of economic, fiscal and management
issues facing city government . . . . ‘I’m
amused’,” smirked Mayor Ed Koch, “they really
like each other and talk about how they attend
each other’s children’s weddings.”41 In the
spring, unions rejected an offer from Governor
Hugh Carey to amend public sector labor law to
make it more like the private sector. Unions
would, effectively, have gained the right to
strike, and employers the unilateral right to
change contract terms at expiration. They opted
instead for defensive stability, and to this day,
the Taylor Law’s anti-strike provision is invoked
as a threat against restive public sector workers.42 And that summer, the state legislature,
responding to growing union concerns that
angry workers were canceling their union memberships, legalized the agency shop, effectively
allowed collection of dues from all represented
workers, members or not. New York’s civil service newspaper bluntly explained why:
An agency shop will help unions be more
objective in dealing with employers and
better able to pursue a more responsible
course of action. . . . Unions, even with
their own financial solvency at stake
agreed to no-raise contracts, wage
increase deferrals and fringe benefit givebacks so the city could avoid bankruptcy
. . . . [The Mayor’s] support of the agency
shop bill was, in part, predicated on protecting the solvency of unions so they, in
turn, would be strong enough to resist
membership pressure. . . . The agency
shop will bring greater stability to labormanagement relations and will result in
more statesmanship on the part of union
leaders who are free from the fear of economic blackmail by their members.43
Here was the tally sheet: non-responsive to
their members, turning their backs on the communities they served, hobnobbing with bankers, abandoning the strike weapon. At best, we
can say that for more than forty years, New
York labor has fought rearguard actions to
defend an unsatisfactory status quo.44 Social
democracy receded in the rearview mirror.

Can Labor Turn This Crisis
into an Opportunity?
Crises are moments of opportunity, but it is not
foreordained who will seize the ring. In the first
years of neoliberalism, New York’s municipal
labor unions, the labor movement as a whole, and
other mass movements of liberation were all far
stronger and more experienced than they are
today, yet shortsightedness and fear meant they
failed to rise to the challenge of those times. They
fragmented into competing interest groups
defending their slice of a shrinking pie, becoming
far less than the sum of their parts. The demands
of austerity might have led to worker–community alliances, but labor was too timid, too afraid
of defeat, too committed to backroom deals, to
vigorously defend the New Deal state and the
Great Compression. We cannot say for sure what
would have happened if labor had acted with the
same boldness as capital and its Washington
allies, but we know the dismal result of the
choices it made: periods of stagnation interspersed with backward lurches. Charitably, we
might forgive their decisions as a misjudging of
entirely new circumstances, but who will excuse
labor today if it treads the same errant path?
The past decade has also shown us tantalizing glimmers of a different trajectory. Occupy
popularized the narrative of the 1 percent—a
new ideological framework. The State
Priorities Partnership, a center-left counterpart
to the better-known American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC), promotes, albeit
cautiously, “a just and equitable America.”45
Think tanks such as the Rutgers-based Center
for Innovation in Worker Organization promote bargaining-for-the-common-good ideas
as a pragmatic strategy to win by building alliances and therefore power.46 Education unions,
such as the Chicago Teachers Union and the
UMass Faculty Staff Union, are trying to apply
those principles and build alliances with the
communities they serve, while teachers in West
Virginia blazed a path to mass support in a
deeply red state.47 The powerful nationwide
Black Lives Matter protests remind us that victories are achievable and aspirations can dramatically expand in the course of just a few
weeks. Finally, where Gotbaum and Shanker
struggled to locate alternate sources of
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revenue, now those are clear: “tax the rich”
plans are abundant, and the ability of
Washington to simply write checks is
manifest.48
Still, honesty compels us to note that, like the
AFL in 1933, there has been more talk than action
by labor. As millions have marched, labor as an
organized presence has been largely absent from
the Black Lives Matter movement, once again
missing an opportunity to build solidarity with
natural allies. And opposition to forthcoming layoffs and service cuts has been largely limited to
insider politics in statehouses and city halls.
Indeed, arguments for extreme caution and
prudence are articulated anew, if with different
rationales: the race to the bottom is an accomplished ideological dogma; unions are too weak
to take risks; workers’ aspirations are more
muted, and most lack experience in even tame
forms of class struggle; and the economic crisis
is only temporary.

There are alternatives to austerity
today as there were then, both
as to raising revenues and how to
spend them.
Labor needs to rethink its shopworn modus
operandi, starting with a willingness to imagine
a wholly different future and a commitment to a
strategy of bargaining for the common good.
Because labor is weak, it is even more imperative that it forges unity with the public it has
spurned for too long. There are alternatives to
austerity today as there were then, both as to
raising revenues and how to spend them.
Success is hardly guaranteed, but now we
know—as our predecessors did not—what the
costs are of shying from that fight.
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